

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

MILAN CINDRIC,	)	CASE NO. 1:16 CV 939
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	JUDGE JAMES S. GWIN
	)	
v.	)	OPINION & ORDER
	)	
STATE OF OHIO, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

On April 20, 2016, Plaintiff *pro se* Milan Cindric filed this action against the State of Ohio, Ohio Governor John Kasich, Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine, Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, the Ohio Bar Association, the American Bar Association, the Lake County Recorders Office, the Lake County Court of Common Pleas Court, Lake County Sheriff Daniel A. Dunlap, Franklin County, Huntington National Bank, and Weltman, Weinberg & Reis, Co., LPA.

The Complaint's allegations are disjointed and unclear, but Plaintiff appears to allege that an error was made at Huntington National Bank concerning a deposit he made. It further appears a judgment in foreclosure was taken against him. He asserts Defendants violated "any and all State and Federal Acts, Codes, Laws, Ordinances, Rules and Statutes." Doc #1, p.4.

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Principles requiring generous construction of *pro se* pleadings are not without limits. See *Wells v. Brown*, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See *Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.*, 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. *Beaudett*, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would "require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a *pro se* plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." *Id.* at 1278.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. *Id.* A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." *Id.* Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement. *Id.* It must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Id.* A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. *Id.* The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. *Id.* Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent

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with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' " *Id.*

Even liberally construed, the Complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting Plaintiff might have a valid claim against these Defendants, *see, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.*, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief), and the Court finds this case is therefore appropriately subject to summary dismissal. *See, Apple v. Glenn*, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)(complaint may be summarily dismissed when claim is not arguably plausible); *see also, Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)(citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the proposition that attenuated or unsubstantial claims divest the district court of jurisdiction); *In re Bendectin Litig.*, 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir.1988)(recognizing that federal question jurisdiction is divested by unsubstantial claims).

Accordingly, this action is dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2016

s/ James S. Gwin  
JAMES S. GWIN  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE